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I. INTRODUCTION
Dead men tell no tales; they neither lie nor speak with verity.
They cannot bare the lie or controvert; no word escapes their lifeless
lips. Whatever thoughts their deathless souls exude are compre-
hended only in unearthly realms. What, then, shall we do when
they are sued? For a century, most jurisdictions answered, "[D]eath
having silenced the one, the law silences the other."'
In a controversy with the estate of a dead person it seems pat-
ently unfair, on superficial consideration, to allow either party to
tegtify to what the deceased did or said when the deceased cannot
be called as a witness to explain or refute the testimony. 2 Because
of this concern most states enacted so- called "dead man" statutes.'
These laws provide that in lawsuits in which the dead person's estate
is a party, the parties are incompetent to testify in their own behalf
about statements of or transactions with the dead person.4
In order to understand the dead man statutes, a brief review
of their history is helpful. Common law considered parties to law-
suits incompetent to testify.' Their testimony was considered so
inherently biased as to be totally unreliable. Such a rule is hard
to comprehend today when we consider each party's right to tell
his side of the story to be a basic tenet of the adversary trial;
1. Newman v. Tipton, 191 Tenn. 461, 465, 234 S.W.2d 994, 996 (1950).
2. See Hood v. Welch, 256 Ark. 362, 507 S.W.2d 503 (1974); Newman v. Tipton,
191 Tenn. 461, 234 S.W.2d 994 (1950); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W.2d
737 (1940). The inability of the dead man to tell his side of the story was the reason for
adopting the dead man statutes. Early Tennessee decisions clearly hold that if the dead man
gave a deposition before his death, the opposing party may testify to the dead man's state-
ments and transactions. E.g., Bingham v. Lavender, 70 Tenn. 48, 49-50 (1878); McDonald
v. Allen, 67 Tenn. 446, 448 (1874). Although a party witness's deposition given before his
opponent's death is admissible, his testimony on the same subjects could not be given after
the opponent's death. Bernard v. Reaves, 27 Tenn. App. 121, 178 S.W.2d 224 (1944).
3. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (3d ed. 1984); Comment, The Tennessee Dead
Man's Statute, 49 TENN. L. REV. 343, 346 (1982).
4. As the Arkansas Supreme Court said: "[A] party may not, over objection of the
administrator, undertake to interpret or express what was in the mind of one whose estate
he sues, by giving details of dealings, negotiations or transactions or by quoting statements
made in relation to such matters." Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 754, 102 S.W.2d 552,
553 (1937). Dead Man statutes have been held also to prohibit written evidence of a dead
man's transactions with and statements to a party witness. E.g., Montague v. Thomason,
91 Tenn. 168, 172, 18 S.W. 264, 265 (1892). Nevertheless, writings executed by the decedent
have been routinely admitted into evidence. See Cline v. Miller, 239 Ark. 104, 387 S.W.2d
609 (1965); Green v. Green, 231 Ark. 218, 329 S.W.2d 411 (1959); Royston v. McCulley,
59 S.W. 725 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).
5. See, e.g., Ballard v. Noaks, 2 Ark. 45 (1839); C.MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (3d.
ed. 1984); Comment, supra note 3.
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however, exclusion of the parties' testimony prevailed until the mid-
nineteenth century, 6 and was not abolished in every state until 1904.1
Tennessee abolished party incompetency in 1870,8 and included
a dead man statute in that law. 9 Arkansas included this evidentiary
reform in its constitution of 1868,10 and incorporated it in the pres-
ent 1874 Constitution.11 The Arkansas dead man statute was spe-
cifically repealed when a version of the revised Uniform Rules of
Evidence was adopted in 1976.12 Under the modern evidence code,
unencumbered with the dead man statute, parties to suits involving
decedents' estates may offer evidence of what the decedent said or
did if the evidence is otherwise admissible. 3
The proposed Tennessee Rules of Evidence state that "[e]very
person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided
6. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (3d ed. 1984); Comment, supra note 3, at
345-46.
7. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 488, at 647 n.1 (Chadbourn rev. 1979); Comment,
supra note 3, at 346.
8. Act of Feb. 24, 1870, ch. 78, 1869-70 Tenn. Pub. Acts 95.
9. Id. The codification of the law appears as Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-
1-203 and provides:
In actions or proceedings by or against executors, administrators, or guardians,
in which judgments may be rendered for or against them, neither party shall
be allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction with or statement
by the testator, intestate, or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite
party. Provided, if a corporation be a party, this disqualification shall extend
to its officers of every grade and its directors.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-203 (1980).
10. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 22.
I. Arkansas Constitution schedule, section 2 provided:
In civil actions, no witness shall be excluded because he is a party to the suit,
or interested in the issue to be tried. Provided, that in actions by or against
executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judgment may be rendered
for or against them, neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other
as to any transactions with or statements of the testator, intestate or ward,
unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party. Provided, further, that
this section may be amended or repealed by the General Assembly.
ARK. CONST. of 1874, sched., § 2 (repealed 1976).
Although both the Arkansas and Tennessee statutes apply to guardians as well as personal
representatives of decedents' estates, that application is beyond the scope of this article.
The competency of criminal defendants to testify in their own behalf was established in
Arkansas by Act LXXXII, 1885 Ark. Acts 126 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2016
(repealed 1977)). See Foster v. State, 45 Ark. 328 (1885).
12. UNIF. R. EVID. Act 1143, § 2, 1975 Ark. Acts 2799 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-1001 (repealed 1979)).
13. Arkansas Rule of Evidence 601 simply provides that "[e]very person is competent
to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." See Davis v. Hare, 262 Ark.
818, 561 S.W.2d 321 (1978).
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in these rules or by statute."' 14 However, the rules as presently
drafted do not contemplate the repeal of the dead man statute. 5
It is the premise of this article that Arkansas's experience of thir-
teen years without the statute has been entirely favorable and
Tennessee would be well-advised to use the advent of its new
evidence code as an opportunity to entomb this inefficacious rule
of evidence.
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE
In reviewing the appellate decisions that consider application
of the dead man statute both in Arkansas and Tennessee, one is
struck by the artificiality of the issue. Because the dead man laws
are statutory, the courts have been forced to apply them; and
because they set up a barrier at the threshold of evidentiary anal-
ysis, the courts deciding these cases have not been free to consider
the logical reasons that should govern admissibility.16
The courts' distaste for these statutes is evident from the strict
construction almost always given them. 7 The cases tend to turn
on construction of a single clause or phrase in the statute. The
decisions are often inconsistent, and behind the printed word, one
can see judges valiantly striving to reach just results despite the
statute. Rarely can one discern a situation where the dead man
statute prevented an injustice. Following is a discussion of the
14. TENN. R. EVrD. 601 (proposed 1987).
15. See TENN. R. EviD. 601 (proposed 1987) advisory committee comment.
16. These considerations are relevancy, competency and reliability. Relevancy is cov-
ered by Arkansas Rules of Evidence 401-10. Competency to testify is determined by the
witness's familiarity with the subject of the testimony rather than by a legislatively imposed
obstacle in the path of reason; ordinary lay witnesses must have personal knowledge, ARK.
R. EvD. 602, and may even offer helpful opinions if the opinions are rationally based on
personal perception. ARK. R. Evm. 701. Witnesses qualified as experts may state opinions
based on facts furnished to them. ARK. R. EVID. 703.
17. See Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937); Grange Warehouse
Ass'n v. Owen, 86 Tenn. 355, 7 S.W. 457 (1888); Rielly v. English, 77 Tenn. 16 (1882);
Haynes v. Cumberland Builders, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); Christofiel
v. Johnson, 40 Tenn. App. 197, 290 S.W.2d 215 (1956); Bernard v. Reaves, 27 Tenn. App.
121, 178 S.W.2d 224 (1944); Kurn v. Weaver, 25 Tenn. App. 556, 161 S.W.2d 1005 (1940);
Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W.2d 737 (1940); Savage v. Savage, 4 Tenn.
App. 277 (1927). Despite the strict construction given the statutes, they have been held to
apply to all civil actions, Free v. Maxwell, 138 Ark. 489, 212 S.W. 325 (1919), both to
suits at law and in equity, Bush v. Prescott & N.W. Ry., 83 Ark. 210, 103 S.W. 176 (1907)
and to those in tort as well as in contract, Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489 (6th Cir.
1974).
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rules construing the dead man statute developed by judicial de-
cisions in Arkansas and Tennessee.
A. The Personal Representative8 Must Be a Party
The courts limited the application of the dead man statute to
suits in which the executor or administrator is a party19 and is
litigating for the estate in that capacity, 0 rather than suing2' or
being sued22 personally. Title contests between heirs or devisees
and purchasers 23 or the widow and heirs,2 4 partition suits,25 claims
by beneficiaries to collect insurance proceeds, 26 boundary disputes
between the widow and a neighbor, 27 and ejectment suits against
the widow 2 have been held to be outside the terms of the statute
because the personal representative is not a party.
The personal representative must be a necessary, 29 rather than
18. The Arkansas statute was held to apply to special as well as to regular admin-
istrators. Brown v. Creekmore, 141 Ark. 512, 217 S.W. 774 (1920).
19. Winston v. Roe, 246 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Matlock v. McCracken,
251 Ark. 972, 479 S.W.2d 508 (1972); Umberger v. Westmo;eland, 218 Ark. 632, 238 S.W.2d
495 (1951); Baker v. Eibler, 216 Ark. 213, 224 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Ladd v. Bones, 213
Ark. 1030, 214 S.W.2d 353 (1948); Veach v. Merchant, 183 Ark. 77, 35 S.W.2d 344 (1931J;
Cothron v. Cothron, 21 Tenn. App. 388, 110 S.W.2d 1054 (1937). The Tennessee statute
was strictly construed early on as not encompassing heirs within the terms "executors" and
"administrators." See Hughlett v. Conner, 59 Tenn. (1 Heisk.) 83 (1873). See also Haynes
v. Cumberland Builders, Inc. 546 S.W.2d 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
20. Watts v. Rayman, 62 Tenn. App. 333, 462 S.W.2d 520 (1970).
21. Turner v. Huggins, 130 Tenn. 181, 169 S.W. 754 (1914); Connor v. Hickey, 48
S.W. 289 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898).
22. Barrineau v. Brown, 240 Ark. 599, 401 S.W.2d 30 (1966); Johnson v. Hall, 68
Tenn. 351 (1878); Alexander v. Kelso, 60 Tenn. 5 (1872); Hooper v. Neubert, 53 Tenn.
App. 233, 381 S.W.2d 569 (1963).
23. Sewell v. Umsted, 169 Ark. 1102, 278 S.W. 36 (1925); Bird v. Jones, 37 Ark.
195 (1881); Bozeman v. Browning, 31 Ark. 364 (1876). See also supra note 19.
24. Justice v. Henley, 27 Tenn. App. 405, 181 S.W.2d 632 (1944); Lawrence v. LaCade,
46 Ark. 378 (1885). See also supra note 19.
25. Edgmon v. Edgmon, 193 Ark. 1076, 104 S.W.2d 452 (1937).
26. Webster v. Telle, 176 Ark. 1149, 6 S.W.2d 28 (1928).
27. Britt v. Berry, 133 Ark. 589, 202 S.W. 830 (1918).
28. Williams v. Prioleau, 123 Ark. 156, 184 S.W. 847 (1916).
29. Hodges v. Hodges, 244 Ark. 94, 424 S.W.2d 174 (1968); Jensen v. Housley, 207
Ark. 742, 182 S.W.2d 758 (1944). Courts may receive the evidence for one purpose and
exclude it for others, as in Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Keeton, 209 Ark. 605, 191 S.W.2d 954
(1946), where a widow/administratrix's testimony as to her husband's dying declarations
was held admissible on the issue of damages for loss of contributions because they would
be recoverable by her personally, but inadmissible on the issue of conscious pain and suffering
because these damages, if recovered, would belong to the estate. And, where five cases were
consolidated for trial, but the administrator was a party to only three of them, the decedent's
statements at the scene of the accident were admitted in the other two cases. McKamey v.
Andrews, 40 Tenn. App. 112, 289 S.W.2d 704 (1955).
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nominal, 0 party for the statute to apply."' Therefore, in a wrong-
ful death suit required to be brought in the name of the personal
representative, but where any recovery would go to the widow,
the widow/executrix/plaintiff was held competent to testify to the
decedent's contributions to her support.32 The statute has been
held not to apply to a suit to set aside a conveyance made by the
decedent during his lifetime, even though the administrator of his
estate is a party.33 If the estate is a co-defendant, the plaintiff's
testimony concerning transactions of the deceased may be ad-
missible against the other defendant, though not admissible against
the estate.
3 4
B. Both Parties Must Have Something at Stake
Because the Tennessee statute is limited to cases where "judg-
ments may be rendered for or against" the personal representative,
the lawsuit must subject assets of the estate to increase or decrease
for the statute to be applicable.3 5 Likewise, the opposing party must
either potentially be entitled to a judgment against the estate3 6 or
must potentially be liable. 7 Will contests,3" widows' actions to take
30. Guyot v. Fletcher, 219 Ark. 561, 243 S.W.2d 639 (1951); St. Louis Union Trust
Co. v. Hammans, 204 Ark. 298, 161 S.W.2d 950 (1942); Brown v. Brown, 134 Ark. 380,
203 S.W. 1009 (1918); Gibson v. Parkey, 142 Tenn. 99, 217 S.W. 647 (1919); Hale v. Kearly,
67 Tenn. 49 (1874); Hill v. Fly, 52 S.W. 731 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).
31. But where the administrator was an improper party plaintiff and the defendant
did not raise the issue of misjoinder, the statute precluded the defendant's testimony. Black-
burn v. Thompson, 127 Ark. 438, 193 S.W. 74 (1917).
32. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Jenkins, 183 Ark. 1071, 40 S.W.2d 439 (1931); St.
Louis & S.F. R.R. v. Conarty, 106 Ark. 421, 155 S.W. 93 (1913), rev'd on other grounds,
238 U.S. 243 (1915). See also Hale v. Kearly, 67 Tenn. 49 (1874). But the decedent's
statements were held inadmissible as to elements for which the estate sought recovery. Robb
v. Woosley, 175 Ark. 43, 295 S.W. 13 (1927). Whether the estate would get the money in
the event of a recovery is the controlling issue. See Houston v. Carson, 219 Ark. 665, 244
S.W.2d 151 (1951) (executrix/heir not allowed to testify in a foreclosure suit brought by
the estate).
33. Montgomery v. Clark, 46 S.W. 466 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898).
34. Bush v. Prescott & N.W. Ry., 83 Ark. 210, 103 S.W. 176 (1907); Carman v.
Huff, 32 Tenn. App. 687, 227 S.W.2d 780 (1949). See also Haynes v. Cumberland Builders,
Inc., 546 S.W.2d 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).
35. Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W.2d 737 (1940). However, in Arkansas,
the statute was held to apply where the estate could only be liable for costs. Blackburn v.
Thompson, 127 Ark. 438, 193 S.W. 74 (1917); Bush v. Prescott & N.W. Ry., 83 Ark. 210,
103 S.W. 176 (1907).
36. Leffew v. Mayes, 685 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
37. Bernard v. Reaves, 27 Tenn. App. 121, 178 S.W.2d 224 (1944); Kurn v. Weaver,
25 Tenn. App. 556, 161 S.W.2d 1005 (1940).
38. Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405 (1908); Franklin v. Franklin,
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against the will, 9 actions to establish parol trusts,4° suits by mort-
gagors to have deeds declared mortgages, 41 and actions by named
beneficiaries to collect on insurance policies42 are considered to be
outside the terms of the statute because they affect only the manner
of distribution of the property in the estate and present no prospect
of gain or risk of loss to the estate.43 But a widow may not testify
regarding her services to her late husband in her action for allotment
of dower because under the terms of the dead man statute judgment
could be rendered for or against the estate." The statute has been
applied most frequently to prevent claimants' testimony supporting
claims against estates.
45
C. The Witness Must Be a Party
The dead man statute forbids testimony of the parties only; 46
it does not apply to other witnesses. 47 In construing the statute as
narrowly as possible in order to allow as much relevant testimony
as possible, the courts of both Arkansas and Tennessee decided
that the witness must not only be a party-he must be an interested
38. Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405 (1908); Franklin v. Franklin,
90 Tenn. 44, 16 S.W. 557 (1891); Davis v. Davis, 74 Tenn. 543 (1880); Orr v. Cox, 71
Tenn. 617 (1879); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W.2d 737 (1940); Patterson
v. Mitchell, 9 Tenn. App. 662 (1929).
39. Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W.2d 737 (1940).
40. Savage v. Savage, 4 Tenn. App. 277 (1927).
41. Sellers v. Sellers, 53 S.W. 316 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).
42. Newark Ins. Co. v. Seyfert, 54 Tenn. App. 459, 392 S.W.2d 336 (1964).
43. Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn. App. 220, 142 S.W.2d 737 (1940).
44. Carter v. Younger, 123 Ark. 266, 185 S.W. 435 (1916) (Other witnesses were,
however, allowed to testify.).
45. See Covington v. Covington, 216 Ark. 549, 226 S.W.2d 557 (1950); Harris v.
Whitworth, 213 Ark. 480, 211 S.W.2d 101 (1948); Rogers v. Stewart, 206 Ark. 1118, 178
S.W.2d 849 (1944); Johnson v. Murphy, 204 Ark. 980, 166 S.W.2d 9 (1942); Wilson v.
Dodson, 203 Ark. 644, 158 S.W.2d 46 (1942); Campbell v. Hammond, 203 Ark. 130, 156
S.W.2d 75 (1941); Bradford v. Reid, 202 Ark. 108, 149 S.W.2d 51 (1941); Peoples Nat'l
Bank v. Cohn, 194 Ark. 1098, 110 S.W.2d 42 (1937); Josephs v. Briant, 108 Ark. 171,
157 S.W. 136 (1913); Miller v. Jones, 32 Ark. 337 (1877); Watts v. Rayman, 62 Tenn. App.
333, 462 S.W.2d 520 (1970); Nance v. Callender, 51 S.W. 1025 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1898);
Still v. Burkett, 39 S.W. 347 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896).
46. See Patrick v. Arkansas Nat'l Bank, 172 Ark. 1103, 292 S.W. 143 (1927); Crocker
v. Crocker, 11 Tenn. App. 354 (1930).
47. Matlock v. McCracken, 251 Ark. 972, 479 S.W.2d 508 (1972); Meers v. Potter,
208 Ark. 965, 188 S.W.2d 500 (1945); Smart v. Owen, 208 Ark. 662, 187 S.W.2d 312 (1945);
Rielly v. English, 77 Tenn. 16 (1882); Fuqua v. Dinwiddie, 74 Tenn. 645 (1881); Carman
v. Huff, 32 Tenn. App. 687, 227 S.W.2d 780 (1949); Nashville Trust Co. v. Williams, 15
Tenn. App. 445 (1932); Brown v. Fuqua, 9 Tenn. App. 22 (1928).
Memphis State University Law Review
party.48 Consequently, in a claim against an Arkansas estate, a
certified public accountant, and the dead man's widow, and his
bookkeeper who was a co-executor were allowed to testify about
the transaction ."
9
Where the original plaintiff's receiver was substituted as the
plaintiff in a suit against an estate, the Arkansas court held that
the original plaintiff could testify.5 0 The Tennessee Supreme Court
took a different view, refusing to let an original payee testify in
a suit on a note brought by an assignee against an administrator."
However, in a case in which a husband executed a note to the
testator and the testator told him to pay it to the wife, both husband
and wife were allowed to testify to the testator's statements in the
executor's suit against them to collect the note.
5 2
Generally, a defendant in a suit by a personal representative
may not testify in his own behalf as to statements of or transactions
with the deceased. 3 Other parties, however, who are neither pur-
suing nor being pursued by the personal representative may testify.1
4
For example, in a suit by a Tennessee executrix against one
judgment debtor to revive a judgment obtained by the dead man,
the statute was held not to prevent another debtor on the same
judgment from testifying against the estate; although he was a party
to the original suit, he was not named as a party in the executrix's
scirefacias action. 5 Furthermore, mere interest in the result is not
sufficient to disqualify a witness; the witness must be a party of
record. 56
48. Walden v. Blassingame, 130 Ark. 448, 197 S.W. 1170 (1917).
49. Gober v. Baker, 239 Ark. 692, 393 S.W.2d 620 (1965). See also In re Estate of
Upchurch, 62 Tenn. App. 634, 466 S.W.2d 886 (1970) (claimant's wife/bookkeeper allowed
to testify about transaction between decedent and claimant).
50. Stanley v. Wilkerson, 63 Ark. 556, 39 S.W. 1043 (1897).
51. Roy v. Sanford, 140 Tenn. 382, 204 S.W. 1159 (1918). Cf. Aymett v. Butler, 76
Tenn. 453 (1881) (estate owed money to judgment debtor; judgment creditor garnished estate;
judgment debtor assigned debt owed by estate to judgment creditor; judgment debtor not
allowed to testify, but opinion indicates it may be because judgment debtor was made a
party). Contra Collier v. Trice. 79 Ark. 414, 96 S.W. 174 (1906).
52. Gibson v. Parkey, 142 Tenn. 99, 217 S.W. 647 (1919).
53. Harrison v. Davidson, 201 Ark. 1185, 149 S.W.2d 49 (1941): Nolen v. Harden,
43 Ark. 307 (1884).
54. Greer v. Stilwell, 184 Ark. 1102, 44 S.W.2d 1082 (1932); Sanders v. McClintock,
175 Ark. 633, 300 S.W. 408 (1927); Rainwater v. Harris, 51 Ark. 401, 11 S.W. 583 (1889);
Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 303, 255 S.W. 366 (1923); Mason v. Spurlock, 63 Tenn.
554 (1874); Hall v. Hall, 39 S.W. 535 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896).
55. Kelton v. Jacobs, 64 Tenn. 574 (1875).
56. Bush v. Evans, 218 Ark. 470, 236 S.W.2d 1013 (1951); Meers v. Potter, 208 Ark.
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Where claims against a decedent's estate are so connected that
they must all succeed or fail together, co-plaintiffs may not testify
in each other's behalf;57 but if the claims, though brought in one
proceeding, are actually separate, each claimant may testify to the
dead man's conversations or transactions with the others."
Often the question has arisen whether agents of parties are for-
bidden to testify by the dead man statute, and, if so, how far the
disqualification extends. Before repeal of the statute in Arkansas,
it was well settled that employees, agents, and servants of parties
could testify. 9
This was also the rule in Tennessee until 1947. 60 Corporate of-
ficers and shareholders, as agents, were considered competent to
testify. 61 For example, in Poole v. First National Bank6 2 the Ten-
nessee Court of Appeals, following precedent, held that the dead
man statute did not apply to a bank cashier and former assistant
cashier in a suit by the bank against an estate to collect a note,
even though the cashier was a shareholder in the bank.
The Poole decision, of course, in finding that corporate share-
holders and directors were not "parties," construed the statute as
applied to corporations almost to the point of annihilation. The
court, obviously realizing that the dead man statute creates more
injustice than it prevents, and that it cannot withstand the
illuminating beam of reasoned inquiry, and faced with a situation
where application of an irrational law would mandate an unfair
965, 188 S.W.2d 500 (1945); Smart v. Owen, 208 Ark. 662, 187 S.W.2d 312 (1945); McRae
v. Holcomb, 46 Ark. 306 (1885); McBrien v. Martin, 87 Tenn. 13, 9 S.W. 201 (1888);
Fuqua v. Dinwiddie, 74 Tenn. 645 (1881); Carman v. Huff, 32 Tenn. App. 687, 227 S.W.2d
780 (1949).
57. Godfrey v. Templeton, 86 Tenn. 161, 6 S.W. 47 (1887) (joint claim of surviving
partners against deceased partner's estate); Durham v. Webb, 46 Tenn. App. 429, 330 S.W.2d
355 (1959) (employees of deceased); Nashville Trust Co. v. Williams, 15 Tenn. App. 445
(1932).
58. Mabry v. Corley, 236 Ark. 306, 365 S.W.2d 711 (1963); Bush v. Evans, 218 Ark.
470, 236 S.W.2d 1013 (1951).
59. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 243 F. Supp. 806 (W.D. Ark. 1965). It should
be noted that in federal civil trials state law determines competency of witnesses to testify
about elements substantively governed by state law. FED. R. EvID. 601. See also People's
Sav. Bank v. Mclnturff, 147 Ark. 296, 227 S.W. 400 (1921).
60. Montague v. Thomason, 91 Tenn. 168, 18 S.W. 264 (1892); McBrien v. Martin,
87 Tenn. 13, 9 S.W. 201 (1888).
61. Nashville Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 123 Tenn. 617, 134 S.W. 311 (1910);
Grange Warehouse Ass'n v. Owen, 86 Tenn. 355, 7 S.W. 457 (1888).
62. 29 Tenn. App. 327, 196 S.W.2d 563 (1946).
1988]
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decision, interpreted the law narrowly so as to avoid a prejudicial
result.
Dogma, however, does not die easily, and in 1947 the Tennessee
legislature added the last sentence to the dead man statute,
providing that "if a corporation be a party, this disqualification
shall extend to its officers of every grade and its directors. ' ' 63 In
Arkansas, the dead man statute was construed in a manner con-
sistent with the Poole decision.64
D. The Witness's Interest Must Not Be Adverse To The Party
Calling Him
The exclusionary effect of the dead man statute applies to a
party witness testifying in his own behalf;65 if the opponent calls
a party as an adverse witness, the dead man statute does not apply.
66
Also, the testimony must be adverse to the opposing party67 before
the statute renders him incompetent. Actual opposition of interest
is required in order to exclude the testimony. 61 If a party called as
a witness by the nominal opponent has no real adverse interest to
the nominal opponent, he may testify.
69
E. The Evidence Must Concern a Transaction or Statement Of
the Decedent7°
Parties are not rendered wholly incompetent to testify by the
dead man statute; they are only made incompetent to testify
63. 1947 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 22, § 2 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-203 (1980)).
64. Cross v. Pharr, 215 Ark. 463, 221 S.W.2d 24 (1949); Smith v. North La. San-
itarium, 181 Ark. 986, 26 S.W.2d 97 (1930) ; Mosley v. Mohawk Lumber Co., 122 Ark.
227, 183 S.W. 187 (1916).
65. Freeman v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 167 Tenn. 399, 70 S.W.2d 25 (1934); Patton v.
Hardison, 20 Tenn. App. 585, 101 S.W.2d 698 (1936).
66. Hill v. McLean, 78 Tenn. 107 (1882).
67. Morton v. Yell, 239 Ark. 195, 388 S.W.2d 88 (1965); Brittian v. McKim, 204
Ark. 647, 164 S.W.2d 435 (1942); Hill v. McLean, 78 Tenn. 107 (1882); Trabue, Davis &
Co. v. Turner, 57 Tenn. 447 (1873); Carman v. Huff, 32 Tenn. App. 687, 227 S.W.2d 780
(1949).
68. See Roy v. Sanford, 140 Tenn. 382, 204 S.W. 1159 (1918); Durham v. Webb, 46
Tenn. App. 429, 330 S.W.2d 355 (1959).
69. Trabue, Davis & Co. v. Turner, 57 Tenn. 447 (1873). But see Ledford v. Lee,
29 Tenn. App. 660, 200 S.W.2d 393 (1946), where the actual hostility of a defendant called
as an adverse witness is questionable.
70. Hood v. Welch, 256 Ark. 362, 507 S.W.2d 503 (1974); Free v. Maxwell, 138 Ark.
489, 212 S.W. 325 (1919); Strayhorn v. McCall, 78 Ark. 209, 95 S.W. 455 (1906) Leffew
v. Mayes, 685 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). See also Note, Evidence - Wills - What
Constitutes Transaction With Decedent Within Meaning of Dead Man's Statute, 1 MEM.
ST. U.L. REV. 229 (1970) (discussing Texas law).
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concerning the dead person's7 statements and transactions.7 2 Much
litigation has turned on whether the conduct in question constituted
a "transaction" with the deceased.73 Generally, Tennessee holds
that transactions consist of things done in the decedent's presence
to which he could testify if alive.
74
Arkansas defines the word "transaction" more narrowly. Quot-
ing the dictionary, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated: "The word
is defined: 'A business deal; an act involving buying and selling;
as, the transactions on the exchange.' Its synonym is negotiation.
75
Under this somewhat narrow definition, the court, in another case,
allowed evidence of what went on in shareholders meetings attended
by the decedent in a suit by his executrix against officers of the
corporation, because the transactions were not the decedent's in-
dividual acts. 76 Also, testimony of expenditures made on behalf of
a deceased has been held not to concern either statements of or
transactions with the deceased,7 7 and testimony describing the wit-
ness's relationship with the deceased was allowed. 78 Likewise, the
court allowed a surviving partner to testify as to her personal con-
tributions to the partnership in a proceeding to wind up its affairs
after the death of the other partner.
79
Vehicle collisions are not considered transactions within the terms
of the Arkansas statute.80 However, Tennessee takes a different
view, holding that in a suit by a guest against a deceased
71. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-203 (1980). The statute only excludes statements of the
"testator, intestate or ward." Therefore, statements that had been made by a deceased,
former administrator were admitted. Wassell v. Armstrong, 35 Ark. 247 (1880).
72. Houston v. Carson, 219 Ark. 665, 244 S.W.2d 151 (1951); Jones v. Waddell, 59
Tenn. 338 (1873).
73. See, e.g., Pierce's Estate v. Pierce, 236 Ark. 412, 366 S.W.2d 276 (1963).
74. Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1974); Waggoner v. Dorris, 17 Tenn.
App. 420, 68 S.W.2d 142 (1933). See Note, Witnesses- Dead Man's Statute in Tort Actions,
21 TENN. L. REv. 788 (1951).
However, observed defects in the decedent's property do not fall within the definition
of "transaction." Newman v. Tipton, 191 Tenn. 461, 234 S.W.2d 994 (1950). See also
Recent Case, Evidence - Dead Man Statute - Observation of Physical Conditions Not a
"Transaction" Within Meaning of Statute, 4 VAND. L. REv. 913 (1951).
75. Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 753, 102 S.W.2d 552, 553 (1937).
76. Spivey v. Pugh, 140 Ark. 296, 305, 215 S.W. 739, 742 (1919).
77. Craig v. Hickman, 247 Ark. 628, 447 S.W.2d 120 (1969); Lasker-Morris Bank &
Trust Co. v. Gans, 132 Ark. 402, 200 S.W. 1029 (1918).
78. Lasker-Morris Bank, 132 Ark. at 410-11, 200 S.W. at 1029, 1031 (1918).
79. Orem v. Moore, 224 Ark. 146, 149, 272 S.W.2d 60, 62 (1954).
80. Eisele v. Beaudoin, 240 Ark. 227, 398 S.W.2d 676 (1966); Rankin v. Morgan,
193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937).
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host-driver's estate, everything the guest and host said or did during
the trip is excluded., Nevertheless, a Tennessee plaintiff may testify
to independently observed facts- 2
Claimants seeking payment from an estate for personal services
performed for the decedent have been precluded from testifying. 3
The rendering of medical care has been held to be a transaction
with the deceased,8 4 and statements of the deceased offered to prove
that medical services were rendered have been held inadmissible."
Similarly, in a medical malpractice suit against a deceased doctor's
estate, testimony concerning the plaintiff's state of mind, offered
on the issue of informed consent, was held inadmissible. 6 Delivery
of a box containing money was held to be a transaction with the
deceased in a suit for conversion.8 7 The facts and statements con-
cerning delivery of an alleged gift were also within the prohibition
of the statute. 8 A widow was not allowed to testify in support of
her contention that the decedent's property was really owned as
an estate by the entirety. 9
Many cases have involved alleged contracts with a decedent.
The making of a parol contract constitutes a transaction to which
the dead man statute applies, 9° as does the decedent's alleged
81. Winston v. Roe, 246 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
82. Christofiel v. Johnson, 40 Tenn. App. 197, 290 S.W.2d 215 (1956).
83. Appolonio v. Baxter, 217 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1954); Campbell v. Hammond, 203
Ark. 130, 156 S.W.2d 75 (1941); Duty v. Keith, 191 Ark. 575, 87 S.W.2d 15 (1935); Graves
v. Bowles, 190 Ark. 579, 79 S.W.2d 995 (1935); Williams v. Walden, 82 Ark. 136, 100
S.W. 898 (1907).
84. Panich v. McLendon, 241 Ark. 576, 409 S.W.2d 497 (1966); Cash v. Kirkham,
67 Ark. 318, 55 S.W. 18 (1900).
85. Oliver v. Thomason, 13 Tenn. App. 307 (1931).
86. Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1974).
87. Nunnally v. Becker, 52 Ark. 550, 13 S.W. 79 (1889).
88. Zimmerman v. Hemann, 142 Ark. 308, 218 S.W. 835 (1920); Wilson v. Edwards,
79 Ark. 69, 94 S.W. 927 (1906); Wilson v. Wilson, 151 Tenn 486, 267 S.W. 364 (1924)
(but other witnesses' testimony was admitted); Gibson v. Buis, 142 Tenn. 133, 218 S.W.
220 (1919); First Nat'l Bank v. Howard, 42 Tenn. App. 347, 302 S.W.2d 516 (1957); Mason
v. Willhite, 61 S.W. 298 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900); Royston v. McCulley, 59 S.W. 725 (Tenn.
Ch. App. 1900).
89. Smith v. Dean, 226 Ark. 438, 439, 290 S.W.2d 439, 440 (1956).
90. McCargo v. Steele, 160 F. Supp. 7 (W.D. Ark.), aff'd, 260 F.2d 753 (8th Cir.
1958) (agreement to make will); Barksdale v. Carr, 235 Ark. 578, 361 S.W.2d 550 (1962)
(agreement not to revoke will); Carpenter v. Franklin, 228 Ark. 512, 308 S.W.2d 829 (1958)
(agreement to sell real property); Merrell v. Smith, 228 Ark. 167, 306 S.W.2d 700 (1957)
(agreement to reconvey real property); Brickey v. Sullivan, 208 Ark. 590, 187 S.W.2d 1
(1945) (agreement to repurchase stock); Eslick v. Friedman, 191 Tenn. 647, 235 S.W.2d
808 (1951) (agreement to make will); Anderson v. Howard, 18 Tenn. App. 169, 74 S.W.2d
387 (1934) (agreement to reconvey real property).
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execution of a note.9' The statute disqualifies a defendant's tes-
timony concerning the decedent's statements promising credits on
a note,92 as well as a payee's testimony regarding an oral agreement
with a deceased payor to waive default alternatives.9 3 But statements
tending to prove an alleged contract between the decedent and his
wife to execute mutual wills were admitted. 94 In Arkansas, a de-
cedent's books of account were admissable to prove a claim against
his estate, 9 but Tennessee holds otherwise. 96
Sometimes evidence inadmissible to prove a transaction with the
deceased has been admitted as proof of another issue, such as au-
thentication of a claim 97 or proof of a routine business custom of
the deceased. 9 A party's testimony about receipt of letters in the
decedent's handwriting or signed by him, their postmarks, and the
fact that envelopes contained the decedent's letterhead are held not
to concern a transaction with the decedent. 99
III. WAIVER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION
Each party to a lawsuit has the right to contradict evidence
introduced by the opposing party, and otherwise inadmissible ev-
idence may be admitted for the purpose of rebuttal. Therefore, if
the plaintiff offers evidence of admissions allegedly made by the
defendant in conversations with a decedent, the defendant may
rebut that evidence by testifying about those conversations. 1° By
calling witnesses to contradict the testimony of the plaintiff's non-
party witnesses, a defendant does not waive the plaintiff's dis-
qualification.' 0 However, if the defendant injects the issue into the
case, the plaintiff may be allowed to testify in rebuttal. 0 2
91. Gist v. Gans, 30 Ark. 285 (1875).
92. Kirby v. Wooten, 132 Ark. 441, 445, 201 S.W. 115, 116 (1918).
93. Nabors v. Gearhiser, 525 S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (Tenn. 1975).
94. Petty v. Nichols' Estate, 569 S.W.2d 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).
95. Gober v. Baker, 239 Ark. 692, 393 S.W.2d 620 (1965); Pierce's Estate v. Pierce,
236 Ark. 412, 366 S.W.2d 276 (1963).
96. Rielly v. English, 77 Tenn. 16 (1882).
97. Chipman v. Perdue, 135 Ark. 559, 205 S.W. 892 (1918).
98. Hall v. Harper, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 462 (1915).
99. Josephs v. Briant, 115 Ark. 538, 172 S.W. 1002 (1914). Accord Minnis v. Abrams,
105 Tenn. 662, 58 S.W. 645 (1900).
100. Gibson v. Buis, 142 Tenn. 133, 218 S.W. 220 (1919).
101. Harris v. Whitworth, 213 Ark. 480, 211 S.W.2d 101 (1948).
102. Wilson v. Wilson, 151 Tenn. 486, 267 S.W. 364 (1924).
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The opponent of the incompetent testimony must object to its
admission. 03 The Arkansas Supreme Court held, however, that when
the inadmissible testimony was allowed on direct examination over
objection, cross-examination on the subject waived the objection. 04
Tennessee holds otherwise: If a proper objection is made when the
testimony is elicited on direct examination, cross-examination on
that subject does not waive the objection. 05 However, if a party
"opens the door" during cross-examination by going into matters
the witness is incompetent to testify about, the disqualification is
waived. 106
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that eliciting incompetent
testimony on deposition or by interrogatories 0 7 waived the dis-
qualification of the witness. 08 Tennessee law was in accord' °9 until
1984, when it adopted the opposite view."10
IV. A RECENT TENNESSEE DEAD MAN CASE
In re Estate of Pritchard v. McDonald, Kuhn, Smith, Miller &
Tait"' illustrates the useless and meaningless arguments which the
dead man statute necessitates. The law firm filed a claim against
the estate of Ms. Pritchard for legal services performed for her
during her lifetime. There had been no written contract and es-
tablishment of the claim depended solely upon the oral testimony
of the lawyer who had done the work. That lawyer was a salaried
associate who had subsequently left the firm. When he was called
to testify, the probate judge sustained the administratrix's objection
on the ground that the dead man statute rendered him incompetent
as an agent of a party. Since his testimony was the only evidence
103. Brickey v. Sullivan, 208 Ark. 590, 187 S.W.2d 1 (1945); Lisko v. Hicks, 195 Ark.
705, 114 S.W.2d 9 (1938); McElroy v. Barkley, 58 S.W. 406 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899).
104. Starbird v. Cheatham, 243 Ark. 181, 419 S.W.2d 114 (1967).
105. Nabors v. Gearhiser, 525 S.W.2d 145 (Tenn. 1975); Bowlen v. Baker, 147 Tenn.
36, 245 S.W. 416 (1922); Leffew v. Mayes, 685 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Durham
v. Webb, 46 Tenn. App. 429, 330 S.W.2d 355 (1959).
106. Harris v. Harris, 225 Ark. 958, 286 S.W.2d 849 (1956); In re Estate of Russell,
52 Tenn. App. 320, 373 S.W.2d 226 (1961); Cotton v. Estate of Roberts, 47 Tenn. App.
277, 337 S.W.2d 776 (1960); Carman v. Huff, 32 Tenn. App. 687, 227 S.W.2d 780 (1949).
107. Mercantile Bank v. Phillips, 260 Ark. 129, 538 S.W.2d 277 (1976).
108. Hood v. Welch, 256 Ark. 362, 507 S.W.2d 503 (1974); Smith v. Clark, 219 Ark.
751, 244 S.W.2d 776 (1952). Contra McCargo v. Steele, 160 F. Supp. 7 (W.D. Ark. 1952),
aff'd, 260 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1958).
109. See Thomas v. Irvin, 90 Tenn. 512, 16 S.W. 1045 (1891).
110. Ingram v. Phillips, 684 S.W.2d 954 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
111. 735 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
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to establish the claim, it failed. The Tennessee Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded, holding that the former associate was not
a party and was therefore competent to testify.
The probate court was clearly wrong in excluding the testi-
mony.' 1 2 The appellate court, relying on Montague v. Thomason,"3
simply held that the associate, as a non-party with no personal
interest in the case, was competent to testify. The court found it
significant that the 1947 amendment extending the statute's dis-
qualification to corporate officers and directors" 4 did not extend
to other kinds of agents.
The striking thing about the Pritchard decision, like so many
of its predecessors, is the total irrelevancy of the argument about
the lawyer's competency to the reliability of his testimony. The
argument was necessary only because the dead man statute exists.
This kind of issue, necessitated by an ill-conceived law, is legal
mumbo jumbo at its worst-devoid of any relation to logic or the
search for a just result. If the law firm had been a professional
corporation and the witness an officer, would his testimony have
been any less reliable? Had he been a present partner would his
testimony have been so unreliable as to justify making him an
incompetent witness? Or should the admissibility of testimony re-
lating to transactions and statements of decedents be admitted or
refused on the same bases of relevance and reliability as other ev-
idence? The author submits that there is no valid reason for ar-
bitrarily disqualifyinq witnesses from testifying to statements of and
transactions with decedents, and that such evidence should be ad-
mitted or excluded on the merit of the evidence, not the identity
of the witness.
V. How ADMISSIBILITY Is DETERMINED UNDER THE UNIFORM
RuLEs OF EVIDENCE
The entire law of evidence deals with four broad concepts: com-
petency, relevance, reliability, and privilege. The first three concepts
are concerned with the merits of the evidence itself. Privileges,
however, are based upon broader societal interests, usually the en-
couragement of free verbal intercourse in certain professional
112. See supra text accompanying notes 47-64. See also supra text accompanying note
Ill.
113. 91 Tenn. 168, 18 S.W. 264 (1892).
114. 1947 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 88 § 2 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-203 (1980)).
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relationships. The existence of a privilege excludes evidence despite
the fact that it is both highly probative and without prejudice in
the context of the particular lawsuit." 5 Since any existing privilege
would act to exclude evidence regardless of the existence of the
dead man statute, privileges will not be discussed further here.
1 6
The concept of reliability is further subdivided into three broad
considerations: hearsay, authenticity, and the "best evidence" rule.
Therefore, without a dead man statute, evidence of what a deceased
person said or transacted, like all evidence, must clear five hurdles
before being admitted: competency, relevance, and the three sub-
categories of reliability. Each of these necessary hurdles will be
discussed separately.
A. Competency of witnesses
Repeal of the dead man statute removes the artificial barrier
to receiving the testimony of party witnesses in lawsuits with de-
cedents' estates. As with other witnesses, establishing a party's com-
petency requires the simple predicate that the party has personal
knowledge of the matters to which he testifies, and this predicate
115. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 72 (3d ed. 1984).
116. It should be noted,however, that there is less uniformity among various "uniform"
codes of evidence on the subject of privilege than any other. The only Federal Rule of
Evidence dealing with privileges, Rule 501, recognizes all constitutionally required privileges,
as well as those created by federal statute, Supreme Court rule or "the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501 (emphasis added). Uniform Rule of Evidence
501, as adopted in Arkansas and proposed in Tennessee, only recogizes privileges created
by constitution, statute or supreme court rule. Therefore, under the revised Uniform Rule
there can be no judicially created, common-law privileges. Arkansas lists a number of priv-
ileges in the following rules of evidence: lawyer-client, ARK. R. EVD. 502; physician and
psychotheraphist-patient, ARK. R. EVID. 503; husband-wife, ARK.R. Evil. 504; religious,
ARK. R. EvID. 505; political vote, ARK. R. EVID. 506; trade secrets, ARK. R. EVlD. 507;
governmental, ARK. R. EvID. 508; and identity of informer, ARK. R. EVID. 509. The pro-
posed Tennessee rules do not contain specific privileges, but append to Rule 501 a list of
existing privileges created by statute or rule: accident report, TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-12-
128 (1980); accountant-client, TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1-116 (1986); attorney-client, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 23-3-105 (1980); attorney-investigator, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-209 (1980);
clergy-penitent, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); deaf person-interpreter, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-103(0 (1980); disciplinary board-complainant, TENN. S. CT. R. 9, § 27.1; grand
jury-witness, TENN. R. CRIM. P. 6(k)(2); legislature-witness, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-113
(1980); medical review committee-informant, TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-219(c) (Supp. 1988);
news reporter, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (Supp. 1988); psychiatrist-patient, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-207 (Supp. 1988); psychologist-patient, TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-11-213 (1986);
social worker-client, TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-23-107 (1986); spousal, TENN. CODE ANN. §§
24-1-201 (1980) & 71-6-106 (1987).
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may be established by his own testimony. 17 Under the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, once this preliminary foundation of personal
knowledge is laid, the court is free to consider the touchstones that
should control admissibility of evidence-its relevance and relia-
bility. No longer is the otherwise admissible testimony of some
parties arbitrarily barred.
Perhaps the most salutary effect of Arkansas's repeal of the
dead man statute when it adopted the revised Uniform Rules of
Evidence"' has been the virtual absence of appeals in which this
formerly oft-litigated issue is raised. 1 9 Further, a review of the
annotations and digests reveals few cases involving decedents' es-
tates which would formerly have been subject to the dead man
statute. The obvious conclusion is that testimony formerly excluded
by the statute was otherwise admissible, and when the artificial
barrier was removed, no legitimate objections to the evidence re-
mained.
B. Relevance
With the issue of witness competency out of the way, the court
should next direct its consideration to the relevance of the evidence.
Because the transactions and statements of the deceased are usually
the operative facts in issue in these cases, relevance is often ap-
parent. Few lawyers will offer evidence that does not have at least
some arguable relevance to a fact in issue. Nevertheless, as with
all evidence, the court must exclude irrelevant evidence' 20 after proper
objection.' 2' The concept of relevance deals with the subject matter
117. ARK. R. EVID. 602.
118. See supra note 11.
119. In Davis v. Hare, 262 Ark. 818, 561 S.W.2d 321 (1978), the competency of a
claimant's testimony against an estate was challenged. The court disposed of the argument
perfunctorily, simply stating that the former constitutional provision had been repealed. Id.
at 819-20, 561 S.W.2d at 324. In Ashmore v. Ford, 267 Ark. 854, 591 S.W.2d 666 (Ct.
App. 1979), a suit arising out of a motorcycle/automobile collision, the trial court refused
to order discovery of the deceased tortfeasor's statement, holding it to be inadmissible under
the dead man statute. On appeal, the defense argued that the statute should apply since
the transactions occurred before its repeal. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
rule of evidence existing at the time of trial (the revised Uniform Rules) applied. Id. at
856-57, 591 S.W.2d at 668. The court assumed that the dead man statute would have applied
had it not been repealed (a questionable assumption). See Eisele v. Beaudoin, 240 Ark. 227,
398 S.W.2d 676 (1966); Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937).
120. UNIF. R. EVID. 402.
121. It is necessary to make a timely objection in order to preserve the issue on appeal.
UNIF. R. EVID. 103(a)(l).
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of evidence. We must ask, "What probative value does this in-
formation have in this case?" Evidence is relevant if it has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. 11 22 If relevant, evidence is
admissible 23 unless the court finds it to be unduly prejudicial, con-
fusing, misleading, cumulative, or wasteful of time.1
24
C. Reliability
Once it is determined that an item of evidence is relevant and
that none of Rule 403's countervailing considerations substantially
outweighs its probative value, the court must consider whether it
is sufficiently reliable to be admitted. The court's determination of
reliability may involve any or all of three evidentiary concepts:
hearsay, authentication and the "best evidence" rule.
1. Hearsay
The most obvious objection to allowing witnesses to tell what
the deceased person said is that such statements are hearsay. Some
decedents' statements, however, may not be hearsay and others,
though hearsay, may nevertheless be admissible. Hearsay is defined
as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while tes-
tifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted."'1 25 If a statement is hearsay, the hearsay
rule forbids its admission unless some applicable exception to the
rule allows it.126 When a hearsay objection is raised,127 the court
must first decide whether the out-of-court statement is hearsay. If
the statement is determined to be hearsay, the court must then
determine whether an exception to the hearsay rule nevertheless will
allow it to be admitted.
122. ARK. R. EVID. 401.
123. ARK. R. EVID. 402.
124. ARK. R. EVID. 403.
125. ARK. R. EVID. 801(c). This definition is incorporated in the proposed Tennessee
rules. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246 (3d ed. 1984).
126. UNIF. R. EVID. 802.
127. Hearsay testimony is considered competent and is entitled to consideration in the
absence of an objection. Wilson v. Kemp, 7 Ark. App. 44, 644 S.W.2d 306 (1982).
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a. Statements that are not hearsay
Only out-of-court statements that were assertions of the de-
clarant are hearsay. 2 This prerequisite to application of the hearsay
rule is sometimes overlooked and nonassertive statements are found
to be hearsay. In fact the author has found no Arkansas case raising
the issue since adoption of the revised Uniform Rules of Evidence.
One cannot make an accidental assertion; it must be intended.
29
Therefore, questions, commands and exclamations not intended as
assertions by the declarant are not hearsay.
If the declarant (the decedent in these cases) intended to assert
something by his statement, the court must next determine whether
the proponent of the statement in the trial would have the factfinder
believe the same thing the declarant would have had his listener
believe. If so, the statement is "offered for truth of the matters
asserted." If offered for some purpose other than to have the fact
finder believe the matters asserted by the declarant, the statement
is not hearsay.
If the fact that the declarant made the statement is an element
or "operative fact" of the lawsuit, the statement is not considered
hearsay. 30 These "operative facts" are sometimes referred to as
verbal acts. Whether a fact to be proved is an operative fact (el-
ement) is determined by the pleadings.
b. Hearsay statements falling within an exception
If a statement is hearsay, the proponent must search for some
exception under which it might be admitted. Any of several ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule may provide the avenue to admis-
sibility. Some of the exceptions most commonly applicable in suits
involving decedents' estates are discussed here.
(1) State of mind
The exception most frequently applicable to statements of a
deceased person is that admitting statements of a declarant's state
128. UNIF. R. EVID. 801(a)(1) & (2). It should be noted that nonverbal conduct, such
as pointing or nodding in assent, may be an assertion if so intended. See TENN. R. EVID.
801 (proposed 1987) advisory committee comment. See also C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246
(3d ed. 1984).
129. FED. R. EvID. 801(a) advisory committee note. UNnF. R. EvID. 801 is exactly the
same as FED. R. EVID. 801. Therefore, the reasoning in the advisory committee's note to
the federal rule is equally applicable to the uniform rule.
130. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 249 (3d ed. 1984).
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of mind.' Most "dead man" cases will involve evidence of the
dead person's state of mind, since they usually concern alleged parol
contracts with the deceased. Both Arkansas and proposed Tennessee
Rule 803(3) include within the exception:
A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind,
motion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.132
Except in cases involving the declarant's will, 13  the exception is
limited to forward-looking statements; backward-looking state-
ments expressing memory or belief are not excepted from the ex-
clusionary rule. 3 4 This limitation is based on relevance, the
backward-looking statements not being considered relevant to pres-
ent state of mind.
35
(2) Admission of a party opponent
A universally recognized, common law exception to the hearsay
rule is the one admitting statements made by opposing parties, 36
no matter how unreliable they may be. The revised Uniform Rules
of Evidence continue to allow introduction of party opponent ad-
missions but classify them as non-hearsay, rather than as exceptions
to the hearsay rule. 137 The proposed Tennessee Rules of Evidence
131. ARK. R. EvID. 803(3) and TENN. R. EvID. 803(3) (proposed 1987).
132. TENN. R. EVID. 803(3) (proposed 1987).
133. Will contest cases are outside the terms of the dead man statute. See supra note
37. The proposed rule, allowing backward-looking statements in wills cases, changes Ten-
nessee law as expressed in Hickey v. Beeler, 180 Tenn. 31, 171 S.W.2d 277 (1943). TENN.
R. EVID. 803(3) (proposed 1987) advisory committee comment. An example of the rule's
application in a will contest case is Greenwood v. Wilson, 267 Ark. 68, 588 S.W.2d 701
(1979).
134. See State v. Abernathy, 265 Ark. 218, 577 S.W.2d 591 (1979); See generally C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 294-96 (3d ed. 1984).
135. Millwee v. Wilburn, 6 Ark. App. 280, 640 S.W.2d 813 (1982) (in a suit by an
executor to set aside a deed and bill of sale executed six months before death, a tape recording
of the decedent made the morning before her death was inadmissible).
136. See G. LILLY, EVIDENCE § 7.1 (2d ed. 1987).
137. ARK. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). The theoretical argument whether admissions should be
classified as hearsay or non-hearsay has filled many a page of scholarly writing. See G.
LILLY, EVIDENCE § 7.1 (2d ed. 1987); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 262 (3d ed. 1984) E.
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 265 (1962); J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 1048 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1972); Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85
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continue the common law tradition of classifying statements of
parties opponent as excepted hearsay.3 8 The Tennessee and com-
mon law classification of admissions as excepted hearsay is a more
sensible approach, simply because it is less complicated and easier
to apply in practice.
Admissions may be vicarious as well as personal, as where they
are adopted'3 9 or authorized' 40 by the party opponent, or made by
his agent14 ' or co-conspirator. 142 One kind of vicarious admission
traditionally recognized is the statement of a person in privity of
estate with a party. 143 The revised Uniform Rules of Evidence, as
adopted in Arkansas, do not include these statements in the def-
inition of admissions. Tennessee, however, proposes to retain this
recognized kind of admission,'"4 so that in the absence of a dead
man statute, vicarious admissions of deceased predecessors in title
would escape the prohibition of the hearsay rule.
(3) Present sense impression and excited utterance
Two closely related exceptions are those for present sense im-
pressions and for excited utterances. Although similar, they are
distinct. The exception for present sense impressions admits state-
ments "describing or explaining an event or condition made while
the declarant was perceiving. . . [it] or immediately thereafter.'
14
The excited utterance exception admits statements "relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
U. PA. L. REv. 484, 564 (1937). Both the Federal and revised Uniform Rules of Evidence
incorporate the non-hearsay rationale because the admissibility of party admissions is "a
product of the adversary system," C. McCORACK EVIDENCE § 262 (3d ed. 1984), rather
than being based on some underlying indicia of reliability as are other hearsay exceptions.
FED. R. EvwD. 801(d)(2) advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 296 (1973). Some scholars
have expressed the opinion that this classification is a mistake. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZ-
BURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 385 n.61 (2d ed. 1982). In practice, it probably
makes no difference. See J. FRIEDENTHAL & M. SINGER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 92 (1985).
138. TENN. R. EvID. 803(1.2) (proposed 1987).
139. ARK. R. Evm. 801(dXii); TENN. R. EvrD. 803(l.2)(b) (proposed 1987). See Thomas
v. State, 10 Ark. App. 294, 663 S.W.2d 745 (1984).
140. ARK. R. EvD. 801(d)(2Xiii); TENN. R. EvID. 803(l.2)(c) (proposed 1987).
141. ARK. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(iv); TENN. R. EvID. 803(l.2)(d) (proposed 1987). See
Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 267 Ark. 544, 592 S.W.2d 445 (1980).
142. ARK. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(v); TENN. R. EvID. 803(l.2)(e) (proposed 1987). See Fox-
worth v. State, 263 Ark. 549, 566 S.W.2d 151 (1978).
143. See, e.g., Barnes v. Young, 238 Ark. 484, 382 S.W.2d 580 (1964); Austin v. Austin,
237 Ark. 127, 372 S.W.2d 231 (1963); C. MCCORPICK, EVIDENCE § 268 (3d ed. 1984).
144. TENN. R. EvIm. 803(1.2)(f) (proposed 1987).
145. ARK. R. Evm. 803(1).
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the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."' 4
Although both derive their justification from the reliability be-
lieved to result from spontaneity, the present sense impression ex-
ception requires that the statement be made during 47 or immediately
after 48 the event, whereas the excited utterance may be made at
any time while the excited condition of the declarant continues.
Therefore, the time elapsed between the event and the declaration
may be greater under the excited utterance exception. 49 The state-
ment of present sense impression is considered reliable because the
speaker did not have time to fabricate, whereas the excited utterance
is considered reliable because the agitated mental state of the de-
clarant is believed to minimize the possibility of fabrication. The
subject matter of the excited utterance may be broader: it must
only be "related to" the event, whereas the statement of present
sense impression must "describe or explain" the event.' 50
Tennessee's proposed Rules of Evidence contain a hearsay ex-
ception for excited utterances,' but delete the exception for present
sense impressions. No explanation for the deletion appears. Rule
803(1), where the exception is located in the revised Uniform Rules
of Evidence, is "reserved," and the comment only states tersely
that "[tihe proposed rules contain no present sense impression ex-
ception. '152
(4) Other hearsay exceptions that may apply
Other hearsay exceptions may apply to statements or documents
memorializing a dead person's transactions in a proper case. Most
exceptions are the same in Tennessee and Arkansas; a few, rec-
ognized in Arkansas, are rejected by the proposed Tennessee Rules
of Evidence, and some, recognized in both states, are slightly dif-
ferent.
Statements of a decedent contained in medical records may be
crucial to proving that the decedent sought medical care in a claim
to secure payment for that care. The proposed Tennessee Rules
146. ARK. R. Evm. 803(2); TENrN. R. Evm. 803(2) (proposed 1987).
147. See Jackson v. State, 267 Ark. 891, 591 S.W.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1979).
148. See Tucker v. State, 264 Ark. 890, 575 S.W.2d 684 (1979).
149. See FED. R. EvrD. 803(1) & (2) advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 304
(1973).
150. See Marx v. State, 291 Ark. 325, 724 S.W.2d 456 (1987).
151. TENN. R. Evm. 803(2) (proposed 1987).
152. TENN.R. EvmD. 803(1) (proposed 1987) advisory committee comment.
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contain an exception for statements made for the purpose of med-
ical diagnosis and treatment."' Under the Uniform and Arkansas
Rules, any such statements made for the purpose of diagnosis or
treatment are admissible. 5 4 The practical effect of Tennessee's lan-
guage change is to limit this exception to statements made to
treating physicians. This is simply a continuation of existing Ten-
nessee law.'
A dead man's business records may be crucial to proving a claim
against his estate; and if the only person who could lay the foun-
dation for introduction of those records was the party opponent
(rendered incompetent to testify to these matters by the dead man
statute), the records could not be introduced. In the absence of a
dead man statute, the party opponent can clear the hearsay hurdle
if he can lay a foundation under the business records exception.1
5 6
Both states recognize an exoeption for family records, such as
notations in the family bible or inscriptions on pictures and tomb-
stones.'57 Statements in unrecorded documents affecting an interest
in property are also excepted from the hearsay rule in Arkansas,
58
and authenticated statements in any document at least twenty years
old are excepted. 5 9 Tennessee takes a somewhat narrower view.
Statements in unrecorded documents affecting an interest in
153. TENN. R. Evm. 803(4) (proposed 1987).
154. ARK.. R. EviD. 803(4). See Wallin v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 268 Ark.
847, 596 S.W.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980).
155. See Gulf Refining Co. v. Frazier, 15 Tenn. App. 662, 688-95 (1932).
156. ARx. R. Evil. 803(6); TEN R. EvD. 803(6) (proposed 1987). Although the rules
dominate this exception, one for "records of regularly conducted activity," a more accurate
name than "business records" since the exception includes records of organizations other
than businesses, the traditional name endures in common parlance and, accordingly, is used
herein. To lay the foundation, the lawyer must call the custodian of the record or any other
witness with personal knowledge of the foundational elements and establish the following
through the answers of the witness: (1) the record was made at or near the time the in-
formation was received; (2) the record was made by or the information was transmitted by
a person with knowledge of that information (in Tennessee, but not in Arkansas, it is also
necessary to establish that the person who made the record or transmitted the information
had a "business duty" to do so); (3) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity; and (4) it was the regular practice to make the record. Id. See
Cates v. State, 267 Ark. 726, 589 S.W.2d 598 (1979).
157. ARK. R. EvD. 803(3); TENN. R. Evm. 803(13) (proposed 1987).
158. ARK. R. Evm. 803(15). Of course, the statement in the document must be au-
thenticated as having been made by the decedent.
159. AsK. R. Evm. 803(16). This is the well recognized "ancient documents" exception.
Before adoption of the Rules in Arkansas, thirty years existence was required for the ex-
ception to apply. Arbuckle v. Matthews, 73 Ark. 27, 83 S.W. 326 (1904).
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property would not be excepted under proposed Tennessee Rules, 160
unless the document is at least thirty years old. Other "ancient




Any documentary evidence of the statements or transactions of
a dead person must be authenticated and he must be identified as
the speaker of any oral statements attributed to him. This prelim-
inary factual determination of whether a document or oral state-
ment is sufficiently likely to be authentic that the jury should be
made aware of it is one to be made by the court. 62 Arkansas and
Tennessee Rule 901(b) both list a number of examples of the kind
of evidence that should be sufficient to persuade the court to allow
introduction of the evidence. The rule emphasizes that the examples
are "by way of illustration only, and not by way of limita-
tion. .... ",163 The court may base its decision on the testimony of
any witness with knowledge that a document is what it is purported
to be,' 64 or on distinctive characteristics of the document.1 65
In cases where the handwriting or signature of the decedent is
in dispute, the court may base its decision on lay opinion if the
witness's familiarity with the decedent's handwriting or signature
was acquired other than for purposes of the instant litigation.' 66
The court may rely upon a comparison of the disputed writing with
an authenticated exemplar by a handwriting expert 67 or make the
comparison itself. 168 An oral statement communicated or recorded
electronically, as by telephone or tape recorder, may be authen-
ticated as that of the dead person by the lay opinion of any witness
who can identify the voice, regardless of how or when the witness
became familiar with the voice. 69 Where the statement was made
160. See TENN. R. Evw. 803(15) (proposed 1987) advisory committee comment ("State-
ments of fact in a warranty deed, trust deed, or security agreement are not trustworthy
enough to justify admissibility as truth.").
161. TENN. R. EviD. 803(16) (proposed 1987).
162. ARK. R. Evrm. 901(a); TENN. R. EviD. 901(a) (proposed 1987).
163. ARK. R. EvID. 901(b); TEN. R. Evm. 901(b) (proposed 1987).
164. ARK. R. EviD. 901(b)(1); TENN. R. Evro. 901(b)(1) (proposed 1987). See United
Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Elder, 272 Ark. 496, 615 S.W.2d 367 (1981).
165. ARuK. R. EvrD. 901(b)(4); TENN. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) (proposed 1987).
166. AsRu. R. EvrD. 901(b)(2); TENN. R. Evm. 901(b)(2) (proposed 1987).
167. ARK. R. Evw. (901(b)(3); TENN. R. Evm. 901(b)(3) (proposed 1987).
168. Id.
169. ARK. R. Evro. 901(b)(5); TENN. R. EvID. 901(b)(5) (proposed 1987).
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over the telephone and the person who heard the statement cannot
identify the voice as that of the decedent, the speaker may be iden-
tified as the decedent by other circumstantial evidence, such as
testimony that the witness dialed the number listed beside the de-
cedent's name in the telephone directory, where circumstances (usu-
ally self-identification) indicate that the speaker was the decedent.
70
Evidence that the call was made to a business and the subject matter
of the conversation was the type normally conducted by that busi-
ness over the telephone may be sufficient.
17'
3. The "Best Evidence" Rule
The "best evidence" rule, more accurately denominated the
"original document" rule, generally requires that the proponent of
a writing, recording, or photograph 72 produce the original if of-
fering it into evidence to prove its contents. 173 The terms are defined
broadly: writings and recordings include "letters, words, numbers,
sounds, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting,
printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechan-
ical or electronic recording, 74 or other form of data compila-
tion"; 75 the term "photographs" encompasses "still photographs,
x-ray films, video tapes, and motion pictures.' 1 76
The term "original" is also defined broadly:
An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or re-
cording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same
effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of
a photograph includes the negative or any print. If data are
stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other
output readable by sight and shown to reflect the data ac-
curately is an "original."' 77
170. ARK. R. EvID. 901(b)(6); TENN. R. EvID. 901(b)(6) (proposed 1987). However,
self-identification alone by an unfamiliar voice during an incoming telephone call was insuffi-
cient. Roleson v. State, 272 Ark. 346, 614 S.W.2d 656 (1981).
171. ARK. R. EVID. 901(b)(6); TENN. R. EvID. 901(b)(6) (proposed 1987).
172. Johnson v. State, 289 Ark. 589, 715 S.W.2d 441 (1986); Redman v. State, 265
Ark. 774, 580 S.W.2d 945 (1979).
173. AK. R. EvID. 1002; TENN. R. EvlD. 1002 (proposed 1987). SeeCanady v. Canady,
285 Ark. 378, 687 S.W.2d 833 (1985).
174. See Sumlin v. State, 266 Ark. 709, 587 S.W.2d 571 (1979).
175. ARK. R. EvID. 1001(1); TENN. R. Evrm. 1001(1) (proposed 1987).
176. ARK. R. EvID. 1001(2); TENN. R. Evlw. 1001(2) (proposed 1987).
177. ARK. R. EvrD. 1001(3); TENN. R. EviD. 1001(3) (proposed 1987).
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The breadth of the definition of "original" satisfies the rule in
many cases. In most other cases the rule is satisfied by the provision
that duplicates are admissible to the same extent as originals unless
there is some genuine question as to the authenticity of the original. 178
Since "duplicates" include carbon copies, photocopies, electronic
re-recordings and other copies made by "equivalent techniques which
accurately reproduce the original,"' 179 almost all documents satisfy
the rule.
If no original is available or if its authenticity has been placed
in issue, other evidence of contents, including oral testimony, 80 is
admissible if any one of four propositions can be proved: (1) that
the original is lost or destroyed through no bad faith of the pro-
ponent; 8 ' (2) that the original cannot be obtained through judicial
process; 8 2 (3) that the opponent had possession of the original and
did not produce it at trial although he had notice that its contents
would be in issue (the notice may be inferred from the pleadings);
or (4) that the document is collateral to any controlling issue.8 3
Finally, the rule does not apply to secondary evidence of contents
offered through the oral testimony, deposition, or written out-of-
court admission of the opposing party.
8 4
VI. CONCLUSION
In the absence of a dead man statute courts will determine the
admissibility of the proof of the deceased's words and dealings on
the basis of their relevance and reliability, as the admissibility of
all unprivileged evidence should be determined. A dead man statute
was from the first an ill-conceived and poorly reasoned exception
to the general qualification of all persons to be witnesses, for what-
ever weight the trier of fact chooses to give to their testimony. Its
application has never prevented injustice and, to the contrary, has
often caused aberrational results because crucial evidence, otherwise
admissible, has been excluded. Because of its deleterious effect on
the process of seeking truth in trial, it has been so riddled with
178. ARK R. EvlD. 1003; TENN. R. EvuD. 1003 (proposed 1987).
179. ARK. R. EviD. 1001(4); TENN. R. Evw. 1001(4) (proposed 1987).
180. See Smith v. State, 286 Ark. 247, 691 S.W.2d 154 (1985).
181. See Renton v. State, 274 Ark. 87, 622 S.W.2d 171 (1981).
182. See Wallace v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934
(1983).
183. ARK. R. Evw. 1004; TENN. R. Evm. 1004 (proposed 1987).
184. ARK. R. EvlD. 1007; TENN. R. EVID. 1007 (proposed 1987).
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limitations and exceptions as to become nothing more than intel-
lectual fodder for lawyers and judges, necessarily chewed and swal-
lowed, though usually not comfortably digested, preliminary to
considering the issues that should control the admissibility of ev-
idence. Its death and burial have been unlamented in Arkansas.
Tennessee would be well-advised to lay the useless creature to its
everlasting rest, like the dead men it supposedly protects.

